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SUMMARY
This paper aims to explain the phenomenon of disinformation and its impact. 
Furthermore, it aims to point out the magnitude and seriousness of the problem, 
as well as the importance of joint action of all social structures in solving it.
The design, production, and dissemination (mainly orally) of untrue and inac-
curate information and news for various purposes have been recorded since 
ancient times. After the invention of the printing machine, their continuous re-
production and distribution began in written form, which also enabled them to 
have a stronger impact, longer duration, and greater reach. Thanks to the devel-
opment of the media, especially the mass media such as newspapers, radio, and 
television, information and news spread faster, more easily and farther, but at 
the same time, disinformation began to appear in the public sphere more often. 
Due to the strong development of technology and the emergence of new digital 
media, primarily the Internet, social networks, and communication platforms, 
as global communication phenomena, this problem has reached worrying, and 
often dangerous, levels in the current digital age and the new media system. Ac-
cording to recent indicators and research, the situation is deteriorating.
Although the number of papers and the amount of research on this topic has 
significantly increased in Europe and the world in recent years, it is a complex 
issue which is still not sufficiently addressed in the scientific discourse. There-
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fore, this paper attempts to provide a clear insight into the definitions and char-
acteristics of disinformation, as a concept that was officially adopted at the 
European Union level, for the purpose of denoting the phenomenon, along with 
related and similar terms such as fake news, misinformation, malinformation, 
information disorder, information pollution, alternative facts and others. This is 
done by including the appropriate theoretical background and the results of a 
series of relevant previous research studies in order to briefly present the his-
torical development and known cases of disinformation, as well as the causes, 
reasons, consequences, and the most sensitive spheres of their production and 
dissemination in modern society. The methods for recognizing, preventing, and 
combating disinformation established thus far are also presented. In addition, 
new measures for their suppression are also proposed.
Keywords: disinformation, new media, fake news, information disorder, new media 
system, digital age, tackling disinformation
Introduction:  
disinformation and fake news through history
Designing, producing and disseminating untrue and inaccurate information and 
news for various purposes, most often for the purpose of propaganda or manipula-
tion, is a phenomenon that is practically as old as human communication itself. Its 
roots and beginnings can be found as far back as ancient times, when usually delib-
erately constructed and publicly placed, false or erroneous information and news 
were spread, mostly orally. As Burkhardt (2017) points out, there have been rumors 
and falsified stories for as long as humans have existed in power-run groups. In the 
beginning, new information was commonly spoken of person to person (2017: 5). 
From then until today, various sources and authors have recorded numerous exam-
ples of production and dissemination of such information, which is most often 
called disinformation or a newer popular term – fake news. Terminological issues 
and views including more detailed explanations of this phenomenon will be dis-
cussed later in this paper1, with several cases pointed out here, which were marked 
throughout history as important or significant.
According to Burkhardt (2017), writing first appeared several thousand years ago 
on materials such as stone, clay, and papyrus, and the information was usually lim-
ited to group leaders, e.g., emperors, pha raohs, religious and military leaders, etc. 
(2017: 5). This power was used by selected persons in various ways, including 
control of information, spreading of influence, as well as producing and publishing 
fake news and information in order to achieve a set goal. One of the first recorded 
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cases dates to the 6th century B.C., when Procopius of Caesarea, the principal histo-
rian of Byzantium, in his treatise called Secret History (reprint 1961), presented 
false information denigrating Emperor Justinian and his wife after their death, prob-
ably in an attempt to ingratiate the new ruler (Burkhardt, 2017: 5). Posetti and Mat-
thews (2018: 1) in turn believe that “misinformation, disinformation and propa-
ganda have been features of human communication since at least the Roman times 
when Antony met Cleopatra”. It was in ancient Rome that the first of a total of more 
than 50 significant historical events took place, which Posetti and Matthews chron-
ologically ranked in their “selected timeline of ‘information disorder’ through the 
ages” (2018: 2-16). Around 44 B.C., after the assassination of Julius Caesar, Octa-
vian used a smear campaign in the form of short, sharp slogans, based on false and 
fictitious information and imprinted them on Roman coins, to discredit his opponent 
Mark Antony. Octavian managed to win this “disinformation war” becoming the 
first Roman emperor Augustus. In other words, “fake news had allowed Octavian to 
hack the republican system once and for all” (Kaminska, 2017). In the following 
centuries and millennia, misinformation continued to be used on many occasions 
for political and war purposes.
Many authors mark the invention and the implementation of the printing press from 
the middle of the 15th century onwards as a turning point for raising this problem to 
a higher level. Posetti and Matthews thus point out: “The invention of the Guten-
berg printing press in 1439 dramatically amplified the dissemination of disinforma-
tion and misinformation” (2018: 1). Namely, this is when the continuous reproduc-
tion and distribution of disinformation in writing started, which also allowed it 
stronger influence, longer duration, and greater reach. The tragic event that Soll 
(2016) describes as the first officially recorded case of fake news also originates 
from that period. On Easter Sunday, 1475, a two-and-a-half-year-old child disap-
peared in the Italian city of Trento, after which the Franciscan preacher Bernardino 
da Feltre held several sermons in which he claimed that members of the Jewish 
community abducted and killed the boy, exsanguinated and drank his blood during 
the Jewish Passover celebration (Soll, 2016). The rumors spread quickly, resulting 
in the arrest and torture of numerous members of the Jewish community in Trento 
and surrounding cities, 15 of whom were found guilty and burned at the stake before 
the false information was discovered. According to Soll (2016), this and similar 
fake news have significantly influenced the spread of anti-Semitism in Europe, 
which is just one of many proofs of how strong, profound, long-lasting and serious 
the consequences of disinformation can be. The use of false information, propa-
ganda and manipulation of the public through the media became an indispensable 
segment of all subsequent major war conflicts, and in particular both world wars. 
For Kunczik and Zipfel (2006: 261), the British-Argentine Falklands War of 1982 is 
a glaring example, when the British military leadership instrumentalized the media 
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by monitoring information and spreading fake news (Cockerell et al., 1984; Morri-
son and Tumber, 1988). Likewise, along with regular information and news, disin-
formation began to appear in the public space during peacetime and in other spheres. 
Thanks to the development of the media, especially mass media such as newspa-
pers, radio and television, untrue information and news are spreading faster, easier 
and further.
Since it is clear that this is not a recent phenomenon, two questions arise: 1. Why 
has disinformation become the focus of the general public in the past few years? and 
2. Why do experts in multiple fields, not just media and communications, claim the 
problem has escalated recently? The answer to the first question is offered by sev-
eral foreign and domestic authors, such as Posetti and Matthews (2018: 7-9), 
Tomljenović (2018: 10) and Barton (2019: 1026), who agree that the phenomenon 
of production and dissemination of disinformation has attracted global attention 
primarily due to two important events on the political map of the world, in which 
they played an important, perhaps crucial, role. These are the referendum on the 
United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union (so-called Brexit) in the spring of 
2016 and the campaign for the US presidential election followed by the election of 
Donald Trump as the new president of the United States in the autumn of the same 
year. Some authors cite the Russo-Ukrainian war (conflict, crisis) as the third impor-
tant, even earlier event in the same context, which began in 2014 and continues to-
day (Thomas, 2014; Mitrokhin, 2015; Himma-Kadakas, 2017: 26; Posetti and Mat-
thews, 2018: 7). On the other hand, the problem of disinformation in the current 
digital age and new media system has reached worrying, often dangerous propor-
tions primarily due to the strong development of technology and the emergence of 
new digital media, owing mostly to the Internet, social networks and communica-
tion platforms, as global communication phenomena. As Nougayrede (2018) warns: 
“The use of propaganda and information fabrication is ancient, but never before has 
there been the technology to so effectively disseminate it” (as cited in Posetti and 
Matthews, 2018: 1). Soll (2016) concludes that fake news became a powerful force 
once again with the appearance of web-generated news, and “yellow journalism” 
came back into the limelight. According to recent indicators and research, the situ-
ation is getting worse, for which there are several other causes and reasons that will 
be later and briefly explained.
Characteristics of new media and the new media system
In the last decades of the 20th century, traditional mass media, such as the press, 
radio and television, were joined by new media and communication means that have 
special features (Labaš, 2009: 14). New media as their collective name has spread 
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everywhere, and they have an increasing role in social communication and are re-
cording unprecedented development (Riva, 2004: 15). Even today, it is still difficult 
to draw precise boundaries between the meaning, scope and content of the terms 
new media and “old media”, especially between some of their characteristics, as 
indicated by Labaš (2009: 14) and Lister et al. (2009: 9–10). For the purposes of this 
paper, new media is viewed in the context of the explanation given by Logan (2016) 
in his book Understanding New Media: Extending Marshall McLuhan. According 
to him, new media “in general refer to those digital media that are interactive, incor-
porate two-way communication and involve some form of computing” (Logan, 
2016: 4). New media “are linked and cross-linked with each other, and the informa-
tion they mediate is very easily processed, stored, transformed, retrieved, hyper-
linked and, perhaps most radical of all, easily searched for and accessed” (Logan, 
2016: 7). For Lister et al. (2009: 13) the key characteristics of the field of new media 
as a whole are digitality, interactivity, hypertextuality, networking, virtuality and 
simulation, to which Labaš (2009: 16) adds multimedia. In addition, Zgrabljić Rotar 
also recognizes as important concepts in new media discourse within the current 
digital culture: mobility, convergence, new audiences, media industry and media 
revolution (2016: 60). Referring to Paccagnella (2004: 165), Labaš emphasizes that 
instead of the term new media, several other names and adjectives are sometimes 
used as its synonyms: cybermedia, multimedia, virtual media, hypermedia, interac-
tive media, digital media and others (2009: 14).
According to Zgrabljić Rotar, there is an extremely diverse new media environment. 
It consists of digital age media, as she calls them, and it is possible to classify them 
into the following groups: traditional media, converged media, new media, and new 
new media (2016: 63). Traditional or classical media and converged traditional me-
dia are considered primarily mass media. Converged media have emerged on the 
Internet platform and allow users to communicate with the media, but they still have 
the basic features of mass media, and the communication model is still “one-to-
many”. These are primarily online newspaper portals, radio on demand, television 
on demand and weblog, i.e., a blog that converged from the former journal (Zgrabljić 
Rotar, 2016). In other words, traditional mass media such as radio, television and 
print journalism have reached a new qualitative level and new virtual media (Jabray-
ilova, 2017: 90) have emerged, i.e., new media expressions uniting their new and 
old features (Zgrabljić Rotar, 2016: 60) thus representing a combination of mass 
media and new media. In addition to converged mass media, “pure” new media (for 
example, e-mail, video games, World Wide Web, and others) have emerged chang-
ing the paradigm of traditional “one-to-many” into “one-to-one” communication 
(Zgrabljić Rotar, 2016: 63). At the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury, the development of a new generation of new media followed, for which Lev-
inson (2013) and Zgrabljić Rotar use the simple term new new media, while some 
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other authors, such as McLean (2014), collectively refer to them as contemporary 
media. This new media group also rests on the Internet platform, but one of its main 
features is that their users are simultaneously producers and consumers of media 
content, the so-called prosumers. The form of communication is “many-to-many” 
(Zgrabljić Rotar, 2016: 64). This category primarily includes social networks, com-
munication platforms and social networking (mobile) applications – e.g., Facebook, 
Instagram, YouTube, Twitter, Whatsapp, Viber and others (Levinson, 2013: 12) – 
which, along with the Internet, are the focus of this paper. To simplify the terminol-
ogy for all the listed media groups, aside from traditional mass media, the umbrella 
term new media is used collectively and is generally accepted.
It has already been mentioned that new media are based on the development of the 
Internet, and Skoko claims the same (2006: 251). Castells (2003) describes the cur-
rent form of the Internet as a global network of computer networks that the World 
Wide Web, an application at the top of the Internet hierarchy, makes easy for the 
user to use (Castells, 2003: 19). Therefore, Maldini considers the Internet “the net-
work of all networks” (2016: 105), and Malović goes a step further, calling it “the 
medium of all media” (2007: 14). The Internet is, therefore, the foundation of the 
emergence and development of several dozen new media forms and types, as far as 
media and communication theorists currently distinguish them. Together, they are 
indispensable parts of the modern global new media system, a term that is in a 
slightly expanded form – new media ecosystem – accepted in official bodies, institu-
tions, and documents of the European Union.
The role of big data in the new media (eco)system
The term new media ecosystem in the modern age “encompasses institutional (typ-
ically newspapers, radio, and television), meso (communication across intercon-
nected peer-to-peer networks, across neighborhoods, and broader community seg-
ments), and micro forms (e.g., social media, interpersonal networks) of communica-
tion, and is the primary context in which citizens are affected by politics, day to day 
events, community issues and events such as natural disasters” (Napoli et al., 2012: 
5). In this environment, as Car and Matas (2019) point out, with the increase in the 
number of users, social networks began to generate endless and diverse amounts of 
information and data (often personal) that users provide every day, leaving behind a 
“digital trace”. Each post, comment or “like” leaves a record on individual users, 
their preferences and expressed attitudes, and all data collected in this way are 
stored in a big database on social network and social media servers (Car and Matas, 
2019: 107-108). Big data refers to data whose amount of digital information ex-
ceeds the storage and processing capacity of a conventional data system (Dumbill, 
2013: 1), and are created by leaving digital traces on digital platforms. More impor-
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tantly, these are interconnected data that carry links to an entire range of other infor-
mation (Car and Matas, 2019: 108). By extracting available information from big 
data and their analysis, useful insights can be obtained, but also goods and services 
that have significant financial, social, or political value (Mayer-Schönberger and 
Cukier, 2013: 10).
The application of big data technology for the collection, processing, and analysis 
of large amounts of data within the new media system has greatly changed global 
political and economic tendencies, including business models of Internet social net-
works. For example, developing software for analytical calculations on social net-
works has enabled microtargeting, i.e., directing the desired messages to targeted 
stakeholders, recognized as receptive audiences for exactly such offered content or 
services (Nield, 2017). Many abuses of this development have already been noticed, 
and one of the most famous examples of scandals is related to the most popular so-
cial network Facebook and the then British consulting and analytical company 
Cambridge Analytica (CA). Namely, in the spring of 2018, it became known that 
CA had obtained the unauthorized personal data of over 87 million Facebook users 
two years earlier (Curtin, 2018). These citizens were then targeted when marketing 
political messages during the Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election campaign, which is believed to have had an impact on results of each2.
In addition to the above, there are other side effects in modern social communica-
tion, with larger or smaller consequences and reach. A document, entitled Council 
conclusions on media literacy in an ever-changing world, warns, among other 
things: “Alongside the numerous advantages and positive effects of the new media 
ecosystem, it has also brought increasing amounts of disinformation, manipulation 
and hate speech.” (The Council of the European Union, 2020: 1).
Precursors, definitions and forms  
of disinformation and related phenomena
The phenomenon that is the central theme of this paper has had several direct or 
indirect historical predecessors, and most of the media literature emphasizes two 
main ones whose roots go deep into the past of mankind. Burkhardt (2017: 5) and 
Maret (2018: 245) believe that the first such phenomenon is rumors. Rumors are 
defined as “talk or opinion widely disseminated with no discernible source”, or 
later on as “a statement or report current without known authority for its truth” 
(Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, 2020). For Pratkanis and Aronson the true prob-
lem arises when unconfirmed rumors are repeated by the media, lending them the 
illusion of respectability (2001: 2), which unfortunately is a regular occurrence. 
Another phenomenon in the media sphere is known as the “journalistic duck” or 
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canard. The literal translation of this French word into English is “duck”, but it is 
used here in a figurative sense. According to Kovačević (2018: 22), in this con-
text, “journalistic duck” or canard means untrue or fictional newspaper news or 
story. Merriam Webster’s Dictionary (2020) explains similarly, stating that ca-
nard is “a false or unfounded report or story”, but also “a groundless rumor or 
belief”. The radio and television lexicon slightly expands these definitions by 
claiming that it is unverified, mostly inaccurate news or information launched 
with the intent to provoke the effect of a sensation about a person or event that 
would otherwise go unnoticed in public (Galić, 2016: 357).
There are several different explanations – etymological, communicative, media and 
other – about how and when the term originated and why a deliberately published 
lie is called a “journalistic duck” or canard. Its first interpretation in the sense of 
“false news” was recorded in mid-18th century (Kovačević, 2018: 22-23). More 
important, however, is that the entry of this once popular journalistic genre into the 
realm of fake news was originally categorized as entertainment, satire or parody. It 
was geared towards amusement or instructing the unwary (Burkhardt, 2017: 7). 
Namely, for a long time, all such news and information were clearly marked at the 
end of the text because the editors and journalists did not want to deliberately mis-
lead their readers. According to Darnton (2017), the first canards were published in 
the 17th century in French newspapers. This light version of fake news retained its 
original form for over 200 years in France and other countries, mostly in Germany 
and England. However, when engravers put Marie-Antoinette’s face on copper 
plates during the French Revolution, the form entered a new phase, that of intention-
ally fake political propaganda (Darnton, 2017), as “the revised image was used to 
disparage the queen” (Burkhardt, 2017: 6). Today, fake and fictional news and infor-
mation are generally no longer labeled (with the exception of satire or parody), and 
their numbers and public presence have multiplied, given that, as Burkhardt warns 
(2017: 7), several turnabouts helped increase the creation and dissemination of this 
kind of information. At the same time, the number of more or less closely related 
terms denoting this phenomenon has also increased. 
Terminological similarities and differences
Without a doubt, the best known and most used term in this area globally is fake 
news. Its popularity was mostly contributed by Donald Trump, the 45th United States 
president, who began using it publicly in 2016, during his first campaign in the US 
presidential election. Posetti and Matthews (2018: 9) note that in his public appear-
ances as presidential candidate and, even more, in his posts on social networks, es-
pecially Twitter, he repeatedly called out and accused political opponents and, in 
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particular, the media who criticized him, of spreading fake news intending to de-
fame him. Pengelly (2016) states that among the first media outlets to be hit by 
Trump’s public verbal and written confrontations was the famous television station 
CNN (Cable News Network). His posts were and still are very well followed, trans-
mitted and commented on. Trump’s rhetoric was soon picked up by many other 
politicians and authoritarian leaders around the world, so the term “fake news” 
quickly spread during 2017, for the purpose of political defense (Galvin, 2017). 
Thus, in July and August 2017, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro described 
foreign media, particularly the BBC and CNN, as “fake news” and “manipulators of 
information” (cf. Posetti and Matthews, 2018: 10; SputnikNews, 2017). On the oth-
er hand, few of Trump’s opponents have been spared as he has continued to behave 
similarly during his presidency. For example, according to the online archive of all 
his posts on Twitter, just in September 2020, during the new election campaign for 
his second presidential term, Trump used the phrase “fake news” as many as 35 
times, i.e., on average more than once a day (Trump Twitter Archive, 2020). In re-
cent publications, Trump has already replaced the term “fake news”3 with a new, 
even stronger phrase, “corrupt news”, and his main target is again various media.
Parallel to the spread and increased use of this term, the need for its expert defini-
tions and explanations grew, of which there were already many. Shu and associates 
opted for a simple definition: “Fake news is a news article that is intentionally and 
verifiably false” (Shu et al., 2017: 23), to which Allcott and Gentzkow add “and 
could mislead readers” (2017: 213). According to Rose, fake news are “wholly or 
mostly fabricated stories in the style of news reports usually posted online and often 
shared virally” (Rose, 2017: 556). Leonhardt and Thompson (2017) provide a more 
comprehensive explanation: “Fake news is a type of yellow journalism or propa-
ganda that consists of deliberate misinformation or hoaxes spread via traditional 
print media, broadcast news media or online social media. Fake news is written and 
published with the intent to mislead in order to damage an agency, entity, or person, 
and/or gain financially or politically, often using sensationalist, dishonest, or out-
right fabricated headlines to increase readership, online sharing, and Internet click 
revenue.” Even though the term “fake news” has in the meantime found its place 
and some recognition in scientific discourse, in recent times a significant number of 
media and communication experts are increasingly advocating that this phenome-
non be defined differently and more precisely. The first reason lies in the “fake 
news” coin itself, which some authors consider inappropriate because it is an oxy-
moron. Namely, Bobić (1987) points out, truthfulness is the very meaning of in-
forming. If it does not contain the truth, the news is meaningless and unnecessary 
(1987: 17). That is, as Malović (2005) succinctly says: news is either true or not 
news (2005: 19). Other authors believe that the term “fake news” is overly broad 
and insufficiently clear. According to Weedon, Nuland and Stamos (2017: 4), it be-
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came a “catch-all phrase to refer to everything from news articles that are factually 
incorrect to opinion pieces, parodies and sarcasm, hoaxes, rumors, memes, online 
abuse, and factual misstatements by public figures that are reported in otherwise 
accurate news pieces” (as cited in Maret, 2018: 245). The third group of authors is 
of the opinion that the term “fake news” simplifies, even trivializes this large, seri-
ous problem, especially if and when it is applied incorrectly. A good example is 
when politicians use the phrase “fake news” exclusively to publicly disqualify any 
opposing opinion or position, as Trump has been doing continuously for years.
For these reasons, in the last few years, several potential alternative terms have been 
proposed to label this phenomenon, and only those that have been officially ac-
cepted so far or are most often mentioned and commented on in public space are 
briefly listed and explained here. Indicatively, the first such term, alternative facts, 
was uttered precisely from the ranks of the Trump administration and was done by 
Senior White House aid Kellyanne Conway in January 2017 on the American na-
tional television company NBC. Defending an untrue statement of the president’s 
press secretary Sean Spicer about the record number of visitors to Donald Trump’s 
inauguration, she replied that these were not lies but “alternative facts” (The Guard-
ian, 2017). This syntagm – like its derivative alternative truth – has provoked nu-
merous reactions and debates and often appears in public discourse, but it has never 
really become satisfactory for naming this phenomenon. Himma-Kadakas (2017) 
explains that the term “alternative facts”, as well as “fake news”, is controversial 
and ambiguous, explaining: “The definition in journalistic approach is that the fact 
is always proven, checked and therefore true – anything alternative to this cannot be 
treated as a fact” (Himma-Kadakas, 2017: 26). It is similar with another concept, 
false information or fake information. According to Herman and Chomsky (2008), 
false information about important things either lie or hinder the expression of an 
unpleasant truth, in order to gain unconditional support for state or corporate inter-
ests. However, Jacquette concludes, false information is not really information, nor 
is it news, even if published as such (2007: 33). Therefore, the use of this term has 
remained primarily colloquial and nonscientific.
Among labels that have, to a greater or lesser extent, been accepted by scientists and 
experts in this regard, some originated even before the issue escalated in the 2010s. 
One of them is information pollution, which was coined in 2002 and first publicly 
presented by Paek-Jae-Cho, former CEO cum president of Korean Telecommunica-
tion Corp. (KTC). Ramesh Pandita (2014) states that Paek-Jae-Cho then referred to 
information technology byproducts, including the unwanted impact it had over so-
ciety seen as information pollution or, in short – infollution. In the modern sense, 
“information pollution is broadly referred as an outcome of information revolution, 
wherein people are supplied with contaminated information, which is of less impor-
tance, irrelevant, unreliable, and unauthentic, which lacks exactness and precision, 
39
Disinformation in the New Media System – Characteristics, Forms, Reasons…
which always has an adverse effect on society at large” (Pandita, 2014: 51). There 
are several sources of “information pollution”, but the new media are prevalent. On 
the other hand, the term information disorder has only recently been presented in 
public, in a Council of Europe Report Information Disorder: Toward an interdisci-
plinary framework for research and policy making published by Wardle and Dera-
khshan in September 2017. They claim it is important to differentiate true from false 
messages, and those intended to do harm from those with no such intentions (War-
dle and Derakhshan, 2017: 20). Accordingly, they differentiate between “three types 
of information disorder:
• Dis-information – information that is false and deliberately created to harm a 
person, social group, organization or country;
• Mis-information – information that is false, but not created with the intention 
of causing harm;
• Mal-information – information that is based on reality, used to inflict harm on 
a person, organization or country.” (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017: 20).
As can be seen in these brief descriptions and in Figure 1, most attributes of “infor-
mation disorder” – the most important ones for this paper – coincide with the central 
term disinformation. Although it is also an older term in media history, it has re-
Figure 1.  Intersection of three types of information disorder  
around the concepts of falseness and harm
Prikaz 1.   Preklapanje triju tipova informacijskoga poremećaja  
oko koncepata neistinitosti i štete
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cently been officially adopted at the level of the European Union for the purpose of 
denoting this phenomenon as it is currently considered the best and most technical. 
Among other things, as Tomljenović (2018: 12) states, the European Commission 
established a High-Level Expert Group (HLEG) on fake news and online disinfor-
mation in the fall of 2017. HLEG avoids using the term “fake news”, because its 
members think that it is not adequate in explaining this complex phenomenon re-
garding disinformation (Tomljenović, 2018: 12). The official definition of the term 
disinformation, as given in the European Commission policy paper Tackling online 
disinformation is: “Disinformation is verifiably false or misleading information cre-
ated, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the 
public. It may have far-reaching consequences, cause public harm, be a threat to 
democratic political and policy-making processes, and may even put the protection 
of EU citizens’ health, security and their environment at risk” (European Commis-
sion, 2020). The explanations of disinformation presented are closest to the chosen 
approach in this paper, where the mentioned problem is primarily observed and 
processed in the sense of intentionally placed and verifiably inaccurate information 
produced and disseminated for various purposes, most often for propaganda or ma-
nipulation purposes. Therefore, the term disinformation is preferred in this paper as 
well, although, with regard to other sources and authors, other substitute terms are 
used in some places, usually in the same or very similar sense.
Types of disinformation and its “close cousins”
Given the complexity of the phenomenon, several classifications of the forms, types 
and “close cousins” of disinformation and related concepts are in circulation today. 
One well-known classification of such content – the three types of information dis-
order by Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) – has already been presented earlier. Fur-
thermore, Allcott and Gentzkow distinguish their six close cousins from “classic” 
fake news: “1) unintentional reporting mistakes; 2) rumors that do not originate 
from a particular news article; 3) conspiracy theories; 4) satire that is unlikely to be 
misconstrued as factual; 5) false statements by politicians; and 6) reports that are 
slanted or misleading but not outright false” (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017: 214). 
That was the basis for many subsequent categorizations and reviews by other ana-
lysts. Claire Wardle later elaborated on her initial classification in the oft-cited pub-
lication Understanding Information Disorder, which came out in October 2019. 
According to her, there is a total of seven types of mis-information and dis-informa-
tion and she considers them a spectrum in which categories are found on a continu-
um from “low harm” to “high harm” (Wardle, 2019: 12), in this order: 1) satire or 
parody – there is no harmful intent but there is a potential to deceive; 2) false con-
nection – using titles, images or captions that are not in accordance with the content; 
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3) misleading content – twisting information in such a way as to give a specific view 
of an issue or person; 4) false context – sharing true content but within a fabricated 
context; 5) imposter content – impersonating real sources; 6) manipulated content 
– manipulating true information or visuals in order to deceive; and 7) fabricated 
content – generating completely false new content, in order for deceitful and harm-
ful purposes (Wardle, 2019: 10–11). Of course, as various types and kinds of false 
information have been recorded, various motives, causes and reasons for their pro-
duction and dissemination have also been detected.
Motives, causes and reasons  
for production and dissemination of disinformation 
It is difficult to summarize in one place all that can be a potential precondition and 
the reasons individuals, institutions and other stakeholders in the new media system 
are prompted to design, produce and disseminate disinformation and their ‘cousins’ 
in the digital age. However, searching through theory, empirical research and practi-
cal examples, a number of factors that are regularly repeated have been singled out.
For Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) there are two key motivations for providing fake 
news: financial and ideological. In the first case, users who notice certain disinfor-
mation often click on the original website, whereby its authors automatically make 
money from advertising (2017: 217). There is a well-known example from 2016, 
when on the eve of the US presidential election it was revealed that in Veles, Mac-
edonia, a group of teenagers launched over 100 websites (according to other sourc-
es, more than 140) used for targeted production of false information predominantly 
in favor of Donald Trump, thus earning tens of thousands of dollars (Subramanian, 
2017). The second, ideological motivation, in turn, implies that producers use disin-
formation to try to increase support for political options, candidates, and ideas they 
favor (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017: 217). To illustrate, after the Brexit referendum, 
a lot of proven false and misleading information was identified, which was deliber-
ately spread on social media and communication platforms by proponents of Brit-
ain’s exit from the European Union and thus probably influencing the outcome of 
the referendum (Reid, 2019). Similar to the previous classification, Wardle believes 
that disinformation is “motivated by three distinct factors: to make money; to have 
political influence, either foreign or domestic; or to cause trouble for the sake of it” 
(Wardle, 2019: 8). Here we should also recall the position of the European Commis-
sion (2020) that disinformation is created for profit or to intentionally deceive the 
public. When it comes to causes and reasons for the production and dissemination 
of disinformation, only the most frequently observed and recognized are listed in 
this paper, due to limited space.
42
Medij. istraž. (god. 26, br. 2) 2020. (29-58)
They primarily include phenomena that are, in simple terms, immanent to human 
nature and could collectively be subsumed under the term “psychosocial character-
istics of persons”. Namely, disinformation producers count on the fact that “people 
are attracted to gossip, rumor, scandal, innuendo4, and the unlikely” (Burkhardt, 
2017: 8). Psychologist Andrea Vranić (2020) adds that three psychological factors 
are primarily the “fertile ground” for accepting and further spread of fake news: 1) 
belief bias – the tendency of people to agree with what is in line with their belief or 
ideology, 2) cognitive laziness – the reluctance to think and analyze what was heard 
and read, and 3) feelings. Disinformation is often emotionally arousing, provocative 
and more likely to grab limited human attention (Vranić, 2020), whether it includes 
enthusiasm, anger or disappointment. Above all, people are social beings, and ac-
cepting someone’s views, including fake news, can lead to social support – a sense 
of belonging and acceptance by people and the society they live in (Vranić, 2020). 
This is built upon by the phenomenon of selective perception of media content, 
which was described by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet in their research study The 
People’s Choice in 1944. They found that during the then US presidential campaign, 
voters primarily accepted the arguments of the party close to them (Lazarsfeld, Be-
relson, & Gaudet, 2005). Disinformation works on the same principle today, target-
ing the views of certain users. Maldini (2008) notes that trust is also a fundamental 
cognitive concept (2008: 155), and distinguishes three levels of trust: personal level, 
general level and institutional-political level, i.e. trust in institutions and political 
power actors (2008: 157). The last level, also called trust in social institutions, is the 
most important for this topic, and several relevant sources record the long-term 
trend of its decline, which has continued in recent years. The Edelman Trust Barom-
eter from 2020 shows that the world’s population have a significant lack of trust in 
the four observed institutions – civil society organizations, businesses, governments 
and the media. In that, the confidence index is the lowest for the media and govern-
ments (Edelman, 2020: 9). It is worrisome that as many as 61% of respondents 
marked the category “a person like yourself” as a very or most credible source, and 
only 36% of them marked the category “journalist” (Edelman, 2020: 63). In other 
words, people prefer to be informed by mere acquaintances and contacts on social 
networks, only on the basis of their similarity to themselves – that is, lay people as 
compared to experts, which opens the door to alternative sources of news and, often, 
disinformation.
Also, two other globally widespread phenomena contain a strong psychosocial 
component: belief in conspiracy theories and political orientation/polarization. Ac-
cording to Keeley (1999), a conspiracy theory is “a proposed explanation of some 
historical event (or events) in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively 
small group of persons — the conspirators – acting in secret” (1999: 116). Allcott 
and Gentzkow (2017) warn that it is hard to verify conspiracy theories as true or 
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false, and they are usually originated by people who believe they are true (2017: 
214). Some of the most widespread conspiracy theories, also perceived as a branch 
of disinformation, deal with the belief that vaccination causes autism (from which 
the whole “anti-vaccine” movement grew), that global warming is a fabrication, and 
that airplanes deliberately leave chemical traces in the sky that harm humans 
(chemtrails). The results of several studies suggest that a more extreme political 
orientation is probably related to a likelihood of spreading disinformation due to a 
stronger tendency to denigrate political rivals. For example, Silverman and associ-
ates conducted an analysis in 2016, which demonstrated that in the studied period, 
a total of six US political Facebook pages – three right-wing and three left-wing – 
continuously shared a number of false and misleading information with a political 
overtone. In this context, we should mention the long-begun complex process of 
globalization, which Maldini (2008) describes as the spread and interpolation of 
identical or similar social structures, patterns, values  and norms in other social spac-
es (2008: 220). In the 21st century, this also includes the globalization of information 
and communication means and messages (Gavranović, 2011: 136), at the center of 
which is the Internet. This has certainly become a catalyst for the spread of disinfor-
mation, especially in the “post-truth” age. It is not a new term, but in the modern 
sense the term “post-truth” was initially used by Ralph Keyes in his book The Post-
Truth Era, published in 2004. Rose (2017) sees today’s world as the age of “post-
truth politics” – a world in which public attitudes are more important than the truth, 
and in which everyone owns their own “facts” (2017: 556) that Maret calls “post-
facts” (2018: 243). According to Harsin (2015), a regime of post-truth or as other 
authors emphasize, a post-truth society is in force.
Reasons and causes of disinformation in new media
Such a situation has given rise to a number of reasons and causes for producing and 
disseminating disinformation, particularly typical of the new media system. The 
introduction of the paper already mentioned the rapid development of technology 
and the emergence and multiplication of the number and types of new, digital me-
dia. The case of Cambridge Analytica, on the other hand, showed what the negative 
side of the application of big data and microtargeting technology could look like. 
These tools can also be abused to spread false and unverified news and data. The 
faster and stronger dissemination of information, and consequently disinformation, 
is greatly influenced by the mentioned new media characteristics such as digitality, 
interactivity, hypertextuality, networking, virtuality, multimedia, mobility, and me-
dia convergence. However, perhaps the most important was the change in the com-
munication paradigm from the former one-way to today’s two-way communication, 
in which all users actually become prosumers, with the crucial difference being that 
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the source of information is now usually incontrollable and unverifiable. Of course, 
the multiplication of problems regarding disinformation is also facilitated by the 
constant growth of users of social networks., applications and communication plat-
forms. According to the global data platform Statista, Facebook had more than 2.7 
billion users in October 2020, YouTube and Whatsapp over two billion, Facebook 
Messenger about 1.3 billion, Instagram 1.158 billion, Snapchat around 433 million, 
Pinterest about 416 million, Twitter around 353 million users, etc. (Statista, 2020). 
The number of followers is on a constant increase, and Zgrabljić Rotar states that 
even newer new media are continuously emerging and finding numerous users 
(2016: 64). For example, currently extremely popular among young people in the 
world is the Chinese application TikTok, which has already attracted almost 700 
million users (Statista, 2020). Furthermore, many citizens continuing to use digital 
media as their main sources of news is a big problem. The findings of the Reuters 
Institute Digital News Report for 2019 show that more than half of the combined 
sample of citizens (55%) prefer to access news via search engines, social media or 
news aggregators, where large technology companies typically use algorithms in-
stead of editors to select and story ranking (Newman et al., 2019: 13). For one, 
“algorithms that create news feeds and compilations have no regard for accuracy 
and objectivity” (Soll, 2016), which is dangerous. At that, social media algorithms 
confine users to “echo chambers” and “filter bubbles”. These are phenomena where 
online algorithms filter information based on previous search queries, allowing for 
potential creation of “bubbles”, where a person is only experiencing their own 
stances and opinions, and all dissenting ones are excluded or minimized 
(Tomljenović, 2018: 9). It is, thus, technically possible to filter media content (pri-
marily data, information and news) based on user preferences (Domingo, 2008: 
687). Such closed circles largely lead to a person receiving only information that 
corresponds to his or her attitudes and beliefs, which in turn prevents critical ap-
proach and thinking.
The production and dissemination of disinformation in the new media system is also 
contributed to by the fact that fake internet news and rumors, much like illnesses 
and infectious diseases, are shaped and transmitted through social contacts, in this 
case through social networks (Kucharski, 2016: 525), which is why they are often 
defined as viral. The current situation is further aggravated by another fact: false 
information is simply adopted and spread faster and retained more permanently than 
the truth. Among the first to prove this was a large-scale new survey conducted in 
2016 by Ipsos Public Affairs for BuzzFeed News. Vranić (2020) points out that a 
comparison of the dissemination and commentary of the 20 biggest fictional news 
(about 8.7 million shares) compared to the 20 most important accurate news about 
what really happened (about 7.3 million shares), in just the last three months of the 
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previous US presidential election campaign, showed significantly greater penetra-
tion of disinformation (Silverman and Singer-Vine, 2016).
Almost all the above motives, causes and reasons for the production and dissemina-
tion of false or unverified information and news are noticeable in the current COV-
ID-19 pandemic. The World Health Organization (WHO) even coined a new term, 
infodemic, to describe the “flood” of information about the disease, among which it 
is often difficult to distinguish true from false information. A disinfodemic version 
was soon coined as well, precisely to draw attention to the numerous disinformation 
and conspiracy theories that, in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic, had 
emerged and spread in the public eye (World Health Organization, 2020). They 
particularly affected those areas of society where disinformation already reaps the 
most dangerous and severe consequences: health, politics, security issues and the 
economy. The European migration crisis, which is the official name for the long-
term migration of inhabitants of African and Asian countries to EU states, which has 
been going on since 2015, also stands out from the current major examples. Repre-
sentatives of the EU and local authorities have repeatedly publicly appealed for a 
cessation of the production and spreading of disinformation against migrants that 
cause panic, fear and hatred in the local population, but without tangible results, so 
most migrants are still exposed to physical attacks, reports and insults.
Existing and potential means and measures to identify  
and tackle disinformation
The previously presented cross-section of this serious global problem and the cur-
rently escalating situation, does not arouse strong optimism when it comes to qual-
ity solutions in the near future. However, in recent years, actors from various social 
spheres have already adopted and developed several means and measures to recog-
nize and combat the production and dissemination of disinformation. As for recog-
nizing false information in public space, perhaps the most famous is the How to 
Spot Fake News infographic, which was designed and published in October 2017 by 
the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA). The 
infographic contains eight useful tips, i.e. simple steps to discover the verifiability 
of published content: 1) consider the source; 2) read beyond (the headlines); 3) 
check the author; 4) (find) supporting sources; 5) check the date; 6) (answer) is it a 
joke?; 7) check your biases; and 8) ask the experts (IFLA, 2017). In 2018, the Croa-
tian Association for Communication and Media Culture supplemented these steps in 
a handbook entitled Family and the Challenges of New Media with a total of ten tips 
on recognizing fake news. In relation to IFLA’s infographic, there are several new 
items and instructions for users: check the domain and layout of the website that 
46
Medij. istraž. (god. 26, br. 2) 2020. (29-58)
published the news; check the impressum (information on owners, editorial staff, 
journalists); check out questionable quotes and photos and, most importantly – think 
before you further share the news (Ciboci et al., 2018: 37). Media experts espe-
cially point out that if information caused strong emotions of any kind, as a rule, its 
veracity should be doubted and further verified.
Regarding tackling disinformation, several already existing means and measures are 
presented here, including proposals for potential means of combating it, as well as 
recommendations and proposed guidelines for a more effective fight against false 
content. Following the example of Haciyakupoglu and associates, this paper advo-
cates a combination of legislative, regulatory and non-legislative measures, i.e., a 
multi-pronged approach that can provide a more comprehensive way of fighting 
fake news. The broad framework in countering fake news includes three kinds of 
measures – pre-emptive, immediate and long-term (Haciyakupoglu et al., 2018: 
14). The means and measures presented here can be roughly divided into preven-
tive, proactive and reactive: 
• Developing precise computer algorithms for recognizing, blocking and delet-
ing disinformation. Mohseni and Ragan (2018) point to the dual nature of 
algorithms that can be both a problem (for example, “filter bubbles” and 
“echo chambers”) and one of the solutions. On the one hand, news feed algo-
rithms can be misused to spread and promote falsified content, affect news 
diversity, or impact credibility. On the other hand, algorithms detecting fake 
news attempt to combat problems by identifying disinformation and fraudu-
lent user profiles (Mohseni i Ragan, 2018: 1). Large social networks have 
been making efforts for years to develop the latter type of algorithms. Spe-
cifically, between March and June 2020, more than 7 million posts contain-
ing disinformation about the current COVID-19 pandemic were deleted from 
Facebook and Instagram (Washington Post, 2020). The problem is that artifi-
cial intelligence (AI) is still not at a high enough level to be able to differenti-
ate true information and news from fake with minimal error. Aside from that, 
Renda (2018) claims, relying solely on the algorithmic content removal is a 
threat for freedom of expression (2018: 17). Therefore, in the summer of 
2018, Facebook also hired a number of human moderators who check the 
accuracy and veracity of the posts in combination with algorithms.
• Increasing the number and quality of fact-checkers. Fact-checkers are not a 
recent phenomenon as they were first recorded a hundred years ago in the 
United States (Vilović, 2007: 118). However, their mass appearance began in 
the 2010s, with the term fact-checkers referring to Internet platforms, (often 
non-profit and non-governmental) organizations and persons in charge of 
verifying the accuracy of information published in public, primarily in the 
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media. According to the October 2020 Duke Reporters’ Lab, there are almost 
300 registered fact-checkers in 84 countries on six continents, the most fa-
mous being the American PolitiFact and the British Full Fact. Fact-checkers 
are conceived as a corrective to the actions of the media and are signatories 
to the Code of Ethics and should be independent and objective. Their biggest 
objections concern the alleged political bias in selection and verification of 
articles. Nevertheless, fact-checkers are certainly useful, and society should 
persevere in their further development, especially since there are still not 
enough of them for quality monitoring and coverage of media content. For 
example, the only fact-checker in Croatia is the Faktograf.hr portal, Face-
book’s official partner in detecting disinformation.
• Creating and adopting new and adjusted legal and media regulations. In this 
respect, the European Union has done insofar, trying to establish effective 
regulation. Therefore, several important documents and legal acts aimed at 
solving this problem have already been adopted, including The Code of Prac-
tice on Disinformation, “the first worldwide self-regulatory set of standards 
to fight disinformation, voluntarily signed by platforms, leading social net-
works, advertisers and advertising industry in October 2018” (European 
Commission, 2020). It was signed by Facebook, Twitter, Mozilla, Google, 
Microsoft and TikTok, among others, and in September 2020, its current im-
plementation was assessed as useful and satisfactory (European Commis-
sion, 2020). It is expected that at the beginning of 2021, the European Com-
mission will adopt the Digital Services Act, which should more clearly regu-
late the disinformation issue. However, legislation and media regulations in 
this area are still deficient and insufficient. This is especially true in Croatia, 
where the problem of fabricating and spreading fake news is at the moment 
practically regulated only by the outdated 1977 Law on Misdemeanors 
against Public Order and Peace, which was last amended in 1994. When 
adopting new legal acts, it is crucial to ensure that their provisions do not 
violate or restrict basic human rights, primarily freedom of information, 
speech and expression as the foundations of a democratic society. The same 
applies to all other existing and suggested measures.
• Further strengthening the scientific and expert approach to the problem of 
disinformation. Since 2016, numerous scientific and professional confer-
ences, symposia and meetings have been organized in Europe and the world, 
many relevant research studies have been conducted and hundreds of scien-
tific papers have been published, helping to understand the global disinfor-
mation problem from several aspects – media, communication, psychologi-
cal, sociological, political science and others. A significant increase in aca-
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demic research interest on this topic is also confirmed by Biloš (2019). His 
meta-analysis of scientific research, which included a total of 393 papers, 
indicated that over 88% were published in the last 5 years (2015–2019), and 
more than half of the papers were published during 2018 (Biloš, 2020: 170). 
At the same time, several expert studies, projects and programs have been 
adopted, such as the Action Plan against Disinformation, which has been 
jointly implemented by several European Union bodies since December 
2018 (European Commission, 2020). Despite the above, lay, populist and 
often trivial treatment of the disinformation issue is still quite present in the 
public discourse, which is why it is necessary to continue strengthening the 
scientific and expert-led approach. Specifically, it is necessary to determine 
as soon as possible a unified and official technical terminology, definitions 
and other important components of this complex problem, about which there 
are still controversies, as shown in this paper.
• Returning to traditional ethical and professional values  of journalism. Un-
fortunately, journalistic ethical and professional values  and postulates are 
some of the biggest victims of the existing new media system and post-truth 
age. This is an extremely unwelcome but expected consequence of the fact 
that literally every literate person with access to the Internet can publish in-
formation, whether it is accurate and true or not. Editors and journalists have, 
seemingly irreversibly, lost their former role as “gatekeepers”, i.e., persons 
who decide what and which kind of information will be placed in the public. 
In the media, the so-called copy & paste journalism is prevalent. Namely, 
often certain interesting information appears in one media outlet, and is con-
veyed by other media uncritically, almost identically and without additional 
verification (Malović, 2014: 129). In such circumstances, this proposed 
measure seems difficult to achieve, but great progress would be made if it 
could be implemented at least in part.
• Increasing the level of media literacy and critical thinking among citizens. 
Many media experts agree that media literacy is one of the major competen-
cies for life in the 21st century (Tomljenović, 2018: 5). Simultaneously, a me-
thodical and strong development of media literacy, along with critical think-
ing in citizens, would in the long run be the best and most efficient step for 
preventing the problem of producing and spreading disinformation. Patricia 
Aufderheide (1993) stated a basic definition of term “media literacy”: „It is 
the ability of a citizen to access, analyze, and produce information for spe-
cific outcomes” (1993: 6). The state of media literacy varies from country to 
country, and Croatia, according to the results of several measurements, is still 
among the worst in the EU in this regard. Several organizations and plat-
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forms in Croatia – like the Association for Communication and Media Cul-
ture, the Agency for Electronic Media and medijskapismenost.hr portal – are 
continuously implementing educational projects and media literacy programs 
for citizens, especially children and youth. However, media literacy should 
become an indispensable part of all levels of compulsory educational pro-
grams in Croatia, starting with pre-school education, because children en-
counter the media exceedingly early. This would, among other things, un-
doubtedly have a positive impact also on the development of self-regulation 
of journalists, media and citizens and increase the level of their social respon-
sibility as other important factors.
Conclusion
As shown in this paper, the phenomenon of production and dissemination of disin-
formation is certainly not new, but many reasons, causes and manners of its origin 
and development are new, which is why it has grown into a very serious and danger-
ous global phenomenon in recent years. This old problem has especially escalated 
in the digital age and the new media system, among other things because – as The 
Council of the European Union (2020) concludes in its recent report on media lit-
eracy – “citizens are overwhelmed with information and have trouble understanding 
the news and finding accurate information, reliable news sources, as well as quality 
content in general” (2020: 1). This was most pronounced during the current COV-
ID-19 pandemic, which often had both fatal and tragic consequences. For example, 
according to research published in the American Journal of Tropical Medicine and 
Hygiene, in the first three months of 2020 alone, more than 800 people worldwide 
died and about 5,800 people were hospitalized as a result of believing widespread 
false information about coronavirus and its treatments (Večernji list, 2020). Thus, 
disinformation has not ceased to cause death since the 15th century, when, based on 
the first officially recorded fake news of a missing and allegedly murdered boy, 15 
members of the Jewish community were murdered in Italy.
Disinformation can, of course, have many other negative consequences on the lives 
and security of citizens and society as a whole, as demonstrated by current examples 
of Brexit, the Russo-Ukrainian war and the European migrant crisis. Largely due to 
the strong development of technology and the emergence of new digital media, 
there is an increasing production and dissemination of false information. Rose 
(2017) points out that news increasingly becomes something that is consumed over 
the Internet, and is also increasingly and virally shared, hence the challenge posed 
by fake news is sure to increase, not diminish (2017: 556). This paper presents a 
number of already existing means and measures for recognizing and combating 
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disinformation, with several new guidelines proposed, emphasizing the very neces-
sary development of media literacy and critical thinking at all levels. The European 
Commission (2020) highlights: “Fighting disinformation in the era of social media 
and online platforms has to be a coordinated effort involving all relevant actors, 
from institutions to social platforms, from news media to single users.” In other 
words, joint action of all social structures is necessary in order to alleviate, if not 
solve, the problem of disinformation, reducing it to a minimum as soon as possible.
It should be noted that this battle includes certain measures and steps, such as the 
adoption of new and amending existing legislation and media regulations, where 
there is a danger of encroaching on some fundamental human rights. Thus, the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights (Article 10.1.) and the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights of the European Union (Article 11.1.) prescribe equally: “Everyone has 
the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions 
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public au-
thority and regardless of frontiers.” (as cited in Renda, 2018: 20). Regarding that, it 
becomes clear how important it is to strike the best possible balance between creat-
ing the necessary legal framework to combat disinformation on the one hand and, 
on the other, preserving the public’s right to accurate and correct information and 
the right of individuals to freedom of speech and expression.
ENDNOTES
1 This paper is based on a presentation given by the author of the paper on November 27, 2019 at the 
Croatian Journalists’ House in Zagreb as part of the international conference Tackling disinforma-
tion in the era of digital media. The presentation was an introduction into later conference lectures, 
discussions and round tables on the topic of disinformation in the modern age, thus presenting the 
basics and framework of this issue, from definitions and scope to how to combat this unwanted 
phenomenon. It is a blueprint followed in this paper.
2 This huge scandal was followed by lawsuits against Facebook, Cambridge Analytica and the SCL 
group to which CA belonged. The case resulted in the closure of Cambridge Analytica, while Face-
book agreed to pay large fines in the United States and the United Kingdom (Zialcita, 2019).
3 Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that he is actually the author of the term “fake news”, but this 
is not true. Most media theorists and journalists, such as Beaujon (2019), attribute the credit to 
Craig Silverman, a Canadian journalist and media editor at BuzzFeed News. Beaujon writes: “Sil-
verman first started using the term ‘fake news’ in the fall of 2014 while he was running a research 
project at Columbia University’s Tow Center for Digital Journalism” (Beaujon, 2019). Two years 
later, Trump took over and popularized the term.
4 Innuendo – “a distortion, half-truth, outright falsity, or unsupported claim presented as the truth” 
(Pratkanis and Aronson, 2001: 26).
51
Disinformation in the New Media System – Characteristics, Forms, Reasons…
REFERENCES
Allcott, H. & M. Gentzkow (2017) “Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Elec-
tion”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31 (2), 211-236. doi: 10.1257/jep. 
31.2.211.
Aufderheide, P. (1993) Media Literacy. A Report of the National Leadership Con-
ference on Media Literacy. Washington: The Aspen Institute.
Barton, C. C. (2019) “Critical Literacy in the Post-Truth Media Landscape”, Policy 
Futures in Education, 17 (8), 1024–1036. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
1478210319831569
Biloš, A. (2019) “Emerging Focus on Fake News Issues in Scientific Research: A 
Preliminary Meta-Analysis Approach”, Interdisciplinary Management Re-
search, 15, 1139-1150. CROSBI ID: 1036464.
Biloš, A. (2020) “Izazovi internetskog informacijskog prostora: kako stanovnici Re-
publike Hrvatske doživljavaju problem lažnih vijesti? (Challenges of Internet 
information space: How do Croatian citizens perceive fake news issue?)”, Cro-
DiM: International Journal of Marketing Science, 3 (1), 166-185. doi: orcid.
org/0000-0003-1676-5959.
Bobić, D. (1987) Što s događajem – o umijeću novinskog obavještavanja. Zagreb: 
Informator.
Burkhardt, J. M. (2017) “History of Fake News”, Library Technology Reports, 53 
(8), 5-9. https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBM-12-2018-2155.
Car, V. & G. Matas (2019) “Istraživački pristupi lažnim vijestima – kako uz pomoć 
big data razotkriti trolove?”, 101–116. In: Hrnjić Kuduzović, Z., M. Kulić & J. 
Jurišić (eds.) Vjerodostojnost medija: doba lažnih informacija (zbornik radova 
9. regionalne naučne konferencije Vjerodostojnost medija). Tuzla: Filozofski 
fakultet Univerziteta u Tuzli.
Castells, M. (2003) Internet galaksija: Razmišljanja o Internetu, poslovanju i 
društvu. Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk.
Ciboci, L., et al. (2018) Obitelj i izazovi novih medija (third supplemented edition). 
Zagreb: Društvo za komunikacijsku i medijsku kulturu.
Cockerell, M. et al. (1984) Sources close to the Prime Minister: inside the hidden 
world of the news manipulators. London: Macmillan.
Domingo, D. (2008) “Interactivity in the Daily Routines of Online Newsrooms: 
Dealing with an Uncomfortable Myth”, Journal of Computer-Mediated Com-
munication, 13(3), 680–704. doi: 10.1111/j.1083-6101.2008.00415.x
Dumbill, E. (2013) “Making Sense of Big Data”, Big Data 1(1), 1–2.
52
Medij. istraž. (god. 26, br. 2) 2020. (29-58)
Galić, M. (ed.) (2016) Leksikon radija i televizije (drugo izdanje). Zagreb: Hrvatska 
radiotelevizija, Naklada Ljevak.
Gavranović, A. (2011) Poslovno novinarstvo između etike i zarade. Zagreb: Dnev- 
nik d.o.o.
Haciyakupoglu, G. et al. (2018) Countering Fake News: A Survey of Recent Global 
Initiatives. Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang 
Technological University.
Harsin, J. (2015) “Regimes of Posttruth, Postpolitics, and Attention Economies”, 
Communication, Culture and Critique, 8 (2), 327–333. doi: https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/cccr.12097.
Herman, E. S. & N. Chomsky (2008) Manufacturing Consent: The Political Econ-
omy and Mass Media. London: Bodley Head.
Himma-Kadakas, M. (2017) “Alternative facts and fake news entering journalistic 
content production cycle”, Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal. 9 (2), 25-40. https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i2.5469.
Jabrayilova, I. G. (2017) “Superiority and problems of new media”, Problems of 
information society, 2, 90-96. doi: 10.25045/jpis.v08.i2.11.
Jacquette, D. (2007) Novinarska etika: moralna odgovornost u medijima. Beograd: 
Službeni glasnik.
Keeley, B. L. (1999) “Of Conspiracy Theories”, Journal of Philosophy, 96 (3), 109–
126. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1084585.
Keyes, R. (2004) The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deceipton in Contemporary 
Life. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Kovačević, B. (2018) “Od A do Ž: Novinska patka, žuta štampa i sedma sila”, 
Hrvatski jezik, 1, 22-25.
Kucharski, A. (2016) “Post-truth: Study epidemiology of fake news”, Nature, 540 
(7634): 525. doi: 10.1038/540525a.
Kunczik, M. & A. Zipfel (2006) Uvod u znanost o medijima i komunikologiju. Za-
greb: Zaklada Friedrich Ebert.
Labaš, D. (2009) “Međuljudska komunikacija, novi mediji i etika”, 13-40. In: 
Labaš, D. (ed.). Novi mediji – nove tehnologije – novi moral (zbornik radova s 
Okruglog stola s međunarodnim sudjelovanjem). Zagreb: Hrvatski studiji 
Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.
Lazarsfeld, P. F., Berelson, B. R. & H. Gaudet (2005) The People’s Choice: How the 
Voter Makes up his Mind in a Presidential Campaign. Ann Arbour: UMI.
Levinson, P. (2013) New New Media (2nd edition). Boston: Pearson.
Lister, M. et al. (2009) New Media: a critical introduction, Second Edition. Lon-
don, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
53
Disinformation in the New Media System – Characteristics, Forms, Reasons…
Logan, R. K. (2016) Understanding New Media: Extending Marshall McLuhan 
(Second Edition). New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc.
Maldini, P. (2008) Demokracija i demokratizacija. Dubrovnik: Sveučilište u Du-
brovniku.
Maldini, P. (2016) “Network Society and Democracy: How ICT Mediated Commu-
nication and Virtual Socialization Affects Political Participation”, Communica-
tion Management Review, 1 (1), Zagreb, 104–121. https://doi.org/10.22522/
cmr20160106.
Malović, S. (2005) Osnove novinarstva. Zagreb: Golden marketing – Tehnička 
 knjiga.
Malović, S. (2007) Mediji i društvo. Zagreb: ICEJ & Sveučilišna knjižara.
Malović, S. (2014) “Masovno komuniciranje”, 40–132. In: Malović, S. (ed.): 
Masov no komuniciranje. Zagreb: Golden marketing – Tehnička knjiga, 
Sveučilište Sjever.
Maret, S. (2018) “The public and its problems: “Fake news” and the battle for hearts 
and minds”, 234-266. In: M. Huff & A. L. Roth (ed.): Censored 2019: Fighting 
the fake news invasion. New York: Seven Stories Press.
Mayer-Schönberger, V. & K. Cukier (2013) Big Data: A Revolution that Will Trans-
form How We Live, Work and Think. London: John Murray
Mitrokhin, N. (2015) “Infiltration, instruction, invasion: Russia’s War in the Don-
bass”, Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, 1 (1), 219–249.
Mohseni, S. & E. D. Ragan (2018) “Combating Fake News with Interpretable News 
Feed Algorithms”, ArXiv, 1-8. New York: Cornell University. doi: http://arxiv.
org/abs/1811.12349.
Morrison, D. E. & H. Thumber (1988) Journalists at War. The Dynamics of News 
Reporting During the Falkland Conflict. London: Sage Publications.
Napoli, P. M. et al. (2012) “Understanding media diversity using media ecosystem 
analysis: A review of the field and recommendations for a way forward”, New 
America Foundation White Paper, 1–28.
Newman, N. et al. (2019) Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019. Reuters In-
stitute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford.
Paccagnella, L. (2004) Sociologia della comunicazione. Bologna: il Mulino.
Pandita, R. (2014) “Information Pollution, a Mounting Threat: Internet a Major 
Causality”, Journal of Information Science Theory and Practice, 2 (4), 49-60. 
doi: 10.1633/JISTaP.2014.2.4.4.
Posetti, J. & A. Matthews (2018) A short guide to the history of ’fake news’ and 
disinformation. Washington D. C.: International Center for Journalists.
Pratkanis, A. R. & E. Aronson (2001) Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and 
Abuse of Persuasion (2nd ed.). New York: Freeman.
54
Medij. istraž. (god. 26, br. 2) 2020. (29-58)
Procopius, Secret History (1961) trans. Richard Atwater. New York: Covici Friede; 
Chicago: P. Covici, 1927; repr. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961.
Riva, G. (2004) Psicologia dei nuovi media. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Rose, J. (2017) “Brexit, Trump, and Post-Truth Politics”, Public Integrity, 19 (6), 
555-558. doi: 10.1080/10999922.2017.1285540.
Shu, K. et al. (2017) “Fake News Detection on Social Media: A Data Mining Per-
spective”, ACM SIGKDD Exploration Newsletter, 19 (1), 22-36. https://dl.acm.
org/doi/10.1145/3137597.3137600.
Skoko, B. (2006) Priručnik za razumijevanje odnosa s javnošću: Knjiga eseja i 
praktičnih uputa za snalaženje u jednome od najpoželjnijih zanimanja da-
našnjice. Zagreb: Millenium promocija d.o.o.
Thomas, T. (2014) “Russia’s information warfare strategy: Can the nation cope in 
future conflicts?” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 27 (1), 101-130. https: 
//doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2014.874845.
Vilović, G. (2007) Povijest vijesti. Zagreb: ICEJ, Sveučilišna knjižara.
Wardle, C. & H. Derakhshan (2017) Information Disorder: Toward an interdis-
ciplinary framework for research and policy making. Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe.
Wardle, C. (2019) Understanding Information Disorder. London: First Draft.
Zgrabljić Rotar, N. (2016) “Novi mediji digitalnog doba”, 57-64. In: Josić, Lj. (ed.): 
Informacijska tehnologija i mediji 2016 (collection of papers). Zagreb: Hrvatski 
studiji Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.
Internet sources
Beaujon, A. (2019) “Trump Claims He Invented the Term “Fake News”— Here’s an 
Interview with the Guy Who Actually Helped Popularize It”, Washingtonian, 2 
October. https://www.washingtonian.com/2019/10/02/trump-claims-he-invent-
ed-the-term-fake-news-an-interview-with-the-guy-who-actually-helped-popu-
larize-it/ (accessed 28 September 2020).
Curtin, M. (2018). Was Your Facebook Data Stolen by Cambridge Analytica? 
Here‟s the Simple Way to Tell, Inc.com, 11 April 2018. https://www.inc.com/
melanie-curtin/was-your-facebook-data-stolen-by-cambridge-analytica-heres-
how-to-tell.html (accessed 8 December 2020).
Darnton, R. (2017) “The True History of Fake News”, The New York Review of 
Books, 13 February 2017. https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/02/13/the-true-
history-of-fake-news/ (accessed 23 September 2020).
Duke Reporters’ Lab (2020) Fact-checking count tops 300 for the first time, 13 Oc-
tober 2020. https://reporterslab.org/latest-news/ (accessed 15 October 2020).
55
Disinformation in the New Media System – Characteristics, Forms, Reasons…
Edelman (2020). Edelman Trust Barometer 2020, 19 January 2020. https://www.
edelman.com/trustbarometer (accessed 28 September 2020).
European Commission (2020) Tackling online disinformation. Last update: 7 July 
2020. https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/tackling-online-disinforma-
tion (accessed 25 September 2020).
Galvin, G. (2017) “The Globalization of ‘Fake News’”, U.S. News, 27 December 
2017. https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2017-12-30/how-
fake-news-charges-spread-around-the-globe (accessed 23 September 2020).
IFLA (2017) How to Spot Fake News, October 2017. https://www.ifla.org/publica-
tions/node/11174 (accessed 26 September 2020).
Kaminska, I. (2017) A module in fake news from the info-wars of ancient Rome, 
Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/aaf2bb08-dca2-11e6-86ac-f253db 
7791c6 (accessed 21 September 2020).
Leonhardt, D. & S. A. Thompson (2017) “Trump’s lies”, The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/23/opinion/trumps-lies.html (ac-
cessed 27 September 2020).
McLean, S. J. (2014) “The Contemporary Media Environment, An Essay”, Media 
Factory, 24 October 2014. http://www.mediafactory.org.au/stephanie-mclean/ 
(accessed 9 December 2020).
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary (2020) Canard. https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/canard (accessed 25 September 2020).
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary (2020) Rumor. https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/rumor#synonyms (accessed 25 September 2020).
Nield, D. (2017) “You Probably Don’t Know All the Ways Facebook Tracks You”, 
Gizmodo. https://gizmodo.com/all-the-ways-facebook-tracks-you-that-you-
might-not-kno-1795604150 (accessed 7 December 2020).
Nougayrede, N. (2018) “In this age of propaganda, we must defend ourselves. 
Here’s how”, The Guardian. 31 January 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2018/jan/31/propaganda-defend-russia-technology (accessed 24 
September 2020).
Pengelly, M. (2016) “Trump accuses CNN of “fake news” over reported Celebrity 
Apprentice plans”, The Guardian, 10 December 2016. https://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/2016/dec/10/trump-celebrity-apprentice-cnn-fake-news (accessed 
27 September 2020).
Reid, A. (2019) “Brexit: The false, misleading and suspicious claims CrossCheck 
has uncovered so far”, First Draft News, 3 October 2019. https://firstdraftnews.
org/latest/brexit-the-false-misleading-and-suspicious-claims-crosscheck-has-
uncovered/ (accessed 29 September 2020).
56
Medij. istraž. (god. 26, br. 2) 2020. (29-58)
Renda, A. (2018) “The legal framework to address ‘fake news’: possible policy ac-
tions at the EU level”, European Parliament, June 2018. https://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/619013/IPOL_IDA(2018)619013_EN.
pdf (accessed 9 December 2020).
Silverman, C. et al. (2016) “Hyperpartisan Facebook Pages Are Publishing False 
and Misleading Information at Alarming Rate”, BuzzFeed News, 20 October 
2016. https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/partisan-fb-pages-
analysis (accessed 29 September 2020).
Silverman, C. & J. Singer-Vine (2016) “Most Americans Who See Fake News Be-
lieve It, New Survey Says”, BuzzFeed News, 6 December 2016. https://www.
buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/fake-news-survey (accessed 29 Sep-
tember 2020).
Soll, J. (2016) “The Long and Brutal History of Fake News”, POLITICO Magazine. 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/fake-news-history-long-vio-
lent-214535?fbclid=IwAR1VY-vzGUlOfl5zerxFTM7_TrHSdCedxj7mYzs0Jl-
RI5Xwg48r2Jngo_xM (accessed 17 September 2020).
SputnikNews (2017) “Maduro Accuses World Media of Spreading Fake News on 
Venezuela”, 27 July 2017. https://sputniknews.com/latam/201707271055924853-
maduro-media-fake-news/ (accessed 23 September 2020).
Statista (2020) Most popular social networks worldwide, October 2020. https://
www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-
of-users/ (accessed 14 October 2020).
Subramanian, S. (2017) “Inside the Macedonian Fake-News Complex”, Wired, 15 
February 2017. https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fake-news/ 
(accessed 28 September 2020).
The Council of the European Union (2020) Council conclusions on media literacy 
in an ever-changing world. 2020/C (193/06). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020XG0609(04)&rid=9 (accessed 29 
September 2020).
The Guardian (2017) “Kellyanne Conway denies Trump press secretary lied: “He 
offered alternative facts”” (video), 22 January 2017. https://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/video/2017/jan/22/kellyanne-conway-trump-press-secretary-al-
ternative-facts-video (accessed 29 September 2020).
Tomljenović, R. (2018) Regulatory Authorities for Electronic Media and Media 
Literacy: Comparative Analysis of the Best European Practices. Council of Eu-
rope. https://rm.coe.int/regulatory-authorities-for-electronic-media/1680903a2a 
(accessed 30 September 2020).
Trump Twitter Archive (2020) http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com/archive/fake% 
20news%20%7C%7C%20fakenews%20%7C%7C%20fake%20media/ttff/1-19 
-2017_ (accessed 3 October 2020).
57
Disinformation in the New Media System – Characteristics, Forms, Reasons…
Večernji list (2020) „Stotine mrtvih zbog lažnih informacija o koroni: pili su meta-
nol, sredstva za čišćenje, kravlji urin“, 13 August 2020. https://www.vecernji.hr/
vijesti/stotine-mrtvih-zbog-dezinformacija-o-koroni-pili-su-metanol-sredstva-
za-ciscenje-kravlji-urin-1423683 (accessed 30 September 2020).
Vranić, A. (2020) “Fake news: priča o novcu, razumu i tri jokera”, Zagrebačko 
psihološko društvo, 8 April 2020. https://zgpd.hr/2020/04/08/fake-news-prica-
o-novcu-razumu-i-tri-jokera/ (accessed 27 September 2020).
Washington Post (2020) “Facebook and Instagram removed 7 million posts for CO-
VID-19 misinformation”, 11 August 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com 
(accessed 29 September 2020).
Weedon, J., Nuland, W. & A. Stamos (2017) “Information Operations and Face-
book”, Facebook, 27 April 2017, v.1.0. https://i2.res.24o.it/pdf2010/Editrice/
ILSOLE24ORE/ILSOLE24ORE/Online/_Oggetti_Embedded/Documenti/2017 
/04/28/facebook-and-information-operations-v1.pdf (accessed 28 September 
2020).
World Health Organization (2020) Call for Action: Managing the Infodemic, 11 
December 2020. https://www.who.int/news/item/11-12-2020-call-for-action-
managing-the-infodemic (accessed 14 December 2020).
Zialcita, P. (2019) Facebook Pays $643,000 Fine for Role in Cambridge Analytica 
Scandal, 30 October 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/10/30/774749376/face-
book-pays-643-000-fine-for-role-in-cambridge-analytica-scandal?t=16085006 
04374 (accessed 8 December 2020).
Dezinformacije u novomedijskom 
sustavu – značajke, oblici, razlozi širenja 
i potencijalni načini njihova suzbijanja
Tomislav Levak
SAŽETAK
Cilj je ovoga rada pojasniti fenomen dezinformacija i njegov utjecaj te ukazati 
na veličinu i ozbiljnost ovoga problema, kao i na važnost zajedničkoga djelova-
nja svih društvenih struktura u njegovu rješavanju.
Osmišljavanje i proizvodnja neistinitih i netočnih informacija i vijesti u različite 
svrhe te njihovo širenje, uglavnom usmenim putem, zabilježeni su još u antičko 
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doba. Nakon izuma tiskarskoga stroja započelo je njihovo kontinuirano umna-
žanje i distribucija i u pisanom obliku, što im je ujedno omogućilo jači utjecaj, 
dulje trajanje i veći doseg. Zahvaljujući razvoju medija, osobito masovnih me-
dija poput novina, radija i televizije, informacije i vijesti širile su sve brže, lakše 
i dalje, no paralelno sve su se češće u javnom prostoru počele pojavljivati i 
 dezinformacije. Zbog snažnoga razvoja tehnologije i pojave novih digitalnih 
medija, u prvom redu interneta, društvenih mreža i komunikacijskih platformi, 
kao globalnih komunikacijskih fenomena, ovaj je problem u aktualnom digital-
nom dobu i novomedijskom sustavu poprimio zabrinjavajuće, nerijetko i opasne 
razmjere. Prema recentnim pokazateljima i istraživanjima situacija se sve više 
pogoršava.
Premda se u posljednjih nekoliko godina u Europi i svijetu značajno povećao 
broj znanstvenih radova i istraživanja na ovu temu, riječ je o kompleksnoj i još 
uvijek nedovoljno obrađenoj problematici u znanstvenom diskursu. Stoga se u 
ovom radu daje pregledan uvid u definicije i značajke dezinformacija, kao 
 pojma koji je na razini Europske unije službeno usvojen u svrhu označavanje 
ove pojave, ali i srodnih i bliskih termina kao što su lažne vijesti (fake news), 
misinformation, malinformation, informacijski poremećaj (information disor-
der), informacijsko zagađenje (information pollution), alternativne činjenice 
(alternative facts) i drugi. Pomoću iznošenja odgovarajuće stručne teorijske 
podloge i rezultata niza relevantnih prethodnih istraživanja, ukratko se prika-
zuju i povijesni razvoj i poznati slučajevi uporabe dezinformacija te uzroci, 
 razlozi, posljedice i najosjetljivije sfere njihove produkcije i širenja u suvreme-
nom društvu. Predočavaju se i do sada utvrđeni načini za prepoznavanje, 
 prevenciju i borbu protiv dezinformacija, ali i predlažu nove mjere za njihovo 
suzbijanje.
Ključne riječi:  dezinformacije, novi mediji, lažne vijesti, informacijski poremećaj, 
novomedijski sustav, digitalno doba, suzbijanje dezinformacija
